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1. Introduction
The following is the first report on Angola under the Country Report
Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
(NORAD), and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and Nordic Consulting Group
(NCG). In line with the contract the report consists of a Part I synthesizing
and assessing basic information regarding economic, political and social
developments in the country, and a Part II focussing on topics related to
Norwegian development aid to be specified by NORAD.
The focus of the current report was discussed in a meeting between the
consultant and Vigdis Varn (NORAD), Gunnar Holm (MFA) and Bjørg Leite
(Norwegian Ambassador to Angola) held at NORAD 31.08.99, and further
elaborated in the ToR dated 05.11.99 (Appendix 1). It was agreed that Part I
of the study should be kept relatively brief, with personnel at MFA/NORAD
who are not in a position to follow events closely as primary target group.
Special emphasis should be given to issues high on the agenda in the national
and international debate on Angola. We have chosen to focus on the current
politico-military situation with UNITA suffering apparently decisive defeats,
and the options for using Angola’s vast oil income for economic and social
development in a situation of relative peace.
As regards Part II, it was initially requested by NORAD that this should give
an overview over government structures and the system of public
administration in Angola. The limited capacity of the latter is considered a
major bottleneck for the implementation of development aid in the country.
At the initiation of the project, however, it became clear that substantial work
had recently been done in this area through the Programa de Reforma
Administrativo do Governo de Angola (MAPESS 1999) and the Human
Development Report on Angola for 1998 (UNDP 1998). However, a need was
expressed by government ministries as well as the Norwegian Embassy for an
overview over the existing social-science capacity in Angola. It was argued
that the lack of updated and relevant information about socio-economic
conditions in the country will be a major constraints in the planning and
implementation of development policies and programs in a situation of
relative peace (see Chapter 2.2.). Consequently Part II contains a general
overview of the system of public administration in Angola, with a particular
emphasis on the state of the social sciences and prospects for their constructive
contribution to development.
Angola is little known in Norway, despite the growing importance of the
country for Norwegian development aid and private enterprise particularly
related to the oil sector. As an additional component and special service to
MFA/NORAD personnel working with the country, it was therefore agreed
that CMI shall set up and maintain a web-site on Angola including i) an
overview over institutions and people working with Angola in Norway, ii)
links to the most relevant information on Angola on the internet and iii) a
brief bibliography on relevant information related to Angola’s history,
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economic conditions and political situation. The page will be updated
regularly.
Fieldwork for this study was carried out in the period between 21 November
and 2 December 1999. I would like to thank the staff at the Norwegian
Embassy in Luanda for their excellent support and willingness to share points
of view during the fieldwork. The analysis and assessments made are those of
the consultants, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of MFA/NORAD.
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2. Political and Economic Conditions
Since its independence from the Portuguese in 1975, Angola has struggled
with discrepancies between political ideology and practice and between
economic potential and actual performance. The last decade a democratic
constitution has been overshadowed by an increasing centralization of power
in the hands of the president. And a huge economic potential has been
overshadowed by a virtual standstill in all economic sectors except the oil
industry. Both the political and economic situation has been decisively
influenced by a near-continuous war-situation, first primarily as a theater for
the Cold War and since 1990 as a civil war between the MPLA government
and UNITA albeit with regional ramifications.
The primary victims of both the political and economic developments have
been the Angolan population. With reference to key priorities in Norwegian
aid policies stating that all development cooperation must help to combat
poverty (NORAD 1999:10), Table 1 lists the most recent data on the socio-
economic conditions on the country. The situation for the  majority of the
population in Angola is one of extreme poverty, vulnerability and despair,
with an estimated 70 percent of the population living below the defined
poverty-line. As opposed to practically all other countries in the sub-Saharan
region, moreover, most indicators have shown a negative trend the past years.
Perhaps the most dramatic expressions of the situation is the under-five
mortality rate implying that 274 out of 1000 children die before they are 5
years old, and the low rate of enrolment in primary school of 29 percent
implying a problematic future for the large majority of those surviving their
first five years.
Table 1: Basic Social Indicators
Indicator Sub-Saharan
Africa
Angola Year
Human Development Index 0.378 0.344 1997
HDI Ranking (out of 174 countries) - 160 1997
GDP per capita (USD) - 510 1999
Life expectancy at birth (years) 51 42 1996
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 105 166 1996
Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 170 274 1996
Maternal mortality rate (per 100.000 live births) 980 1281 1996
Children 1 year vaccinated  (%) - 17 1996
Infants with low birth weight (%) 16 18 1996
Children with malnutrition /underweight (%) 30 42 1996
Access to safe water (%) 49 55 1996
Access to adequate sanitation (%) 44 40 1996
Net enrolment basic education (%) 61 29 1999
Pupils reaching fifth grade (%) 67 30 1995
Adult literacy rate (%) 67 50 1995
Source: Hodges (forthcoming 2000); UNDP 1999a, b.
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Recommended readings: General introductions to
Angola include EIU 1993, Collelo 1989, Tvedten 1997
and Hodges (forthcoming 2000). Historical
introductions include Birmingham 1965,  Bender 1978
and Broadhead 1992. Data on current socio-economic
conditions are available in UNDP 1998, 1999a, and
UNICEF 1999.
2.1 Recent Politico-Military Developments
Important political milestones leading up to the current politico-military
situation to be describes below are:
· The Bicesse-agreement from 1990, which marked the end of a prolonged
and intensive war involving national as well as international actors.
· A period of  relative peace between 1990 and 1992, leading to important
changes towards political democratization and economic liberalization.
· Elections in September 1992, with victory for MPLA in the parliamentary
election and for Eduardo dos Santos in the presidential election.
· Breakdown of the process of peace and democratization in the end of
1992, when UNITA and Jonas Savimbi took Angola back to war after
electoral defeat.
· A period of intensive war between 1992 and 1994, leading to severe
casualties and control of large areas of the country under UNITA.
· The Lusaka Accord in November 1994, involving plans for
demilitarization and enhanced political influence for UNITA.
· Continued inability of the international community through the UN to put
force behind agreements it has initiated, and a subsequent escalation of
war from late 1998.
· A deteriorating political legitimacy of the MPLA-government, with
increased centralization of power around the president and increased high-
level corruption. The government refuses further negotiations with Jonas
Savimbi, and embarks upon a  total-onslaught strategy.
· A deteriorating international legitimacy for Unita, as Jonas Savimbi is
increasingly blamed for the continued war-situation and central western
powers become increasingly involved in the Angolan oil boom.
International sanctions against Unita become more effective.
Since the end of 1998, the combined effects of the militarization of
government policies and  isolation of Unita has led to a situation where the
war seems to be in a decisive phase. Government forces took over Unita
strongholds in the central highland (Andulo and Bailundo) in the autumn of
1999, with an estimated 80 percent of Unita’s military power being destroyed.
A number of top Unita officials also defected. Fighting is currently taking
place along the eastern and southern borders of Angola, with towns and
villages that have been controlled by Unita for years (including Jamba and
Calai) being taken over by government forces.
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The outcome of this development will to a large extent depend on the fate of
Jonas Savimbi. Most observers believe that Savimbi is very important for
Unita, and that the movement will change significantly when he is not in
power. There are currently strong rumors in Luanda that Savimbi already is
captured or dead,1 and signs of increasing contention between individuals and
factions in the movement. In any case, however, Savimbi and Unita have
received severe blows which will make it difficult regain the military power
they have had with control of up to 70 percent of Angolan territory. Spread
fighting with isolated groups will probably still take place for many years to
come, but the majority of Unita officials will see the political option as their
best stake with a military defeat. The Lusaka Agreement from November
1994 gave Unita considerable political concessions.
Parallel with the recent military developments, the government has distanced
itself more and more from the democratic ideals in the constitution. This
implies that it is far from certain that absence of war will lead to significant
political changes. The fact that many powerholders have acquired vested
interests in a continued war, or at least a continued chaotic political situation,
is perhaps the most disturbing development the past few years.
Increasing power seems to be vested with President Eduardo dos Santos,
exceeding the already strong presidential power vested in the constitution. The
president is formally head of state and head of the armed forces. He also
controls the government (which is formally accountable to the Parliament)
through his power to appoint and remove ministers, and the Council of
Ministers is kept out of major decisions. The weak position of the Council of
Ministers was clearly demonstrated in early 1999, when the President
dispensed of the office of the Prime Minister altogether.
Parliament’s ability to provide real checks and balances is also limited. The
weakness and limited presence of the major opposition party Unita is
important, being split into two factions headed by Jorge Valentin and Abel
Chivukuvuku respectively and with a number of the 70 seats won by members
loyal to the military faction headed by Savimbi not being filled. In addition,
the parliament is also weakened by inefficient parliamentary procedures,
inadequate resources and poor access to information. Finally, the financial
dependence on the government by the opposition parties and most deputies
represents a fundamental problem for their independence.
The system of political decentralization envisaged in the Constitution has
suffered from the failure to sustain and consolidate the peace process. The
system has three tiers of administration with 18 provinces, 163 municipalities
and 532 communes. Throughout the period from 1992 the issue of local
government has effectively been shelved, and local government structure are
extremely inefficient if they exist at all. The exception seems to be the
                                           
1 If captured, the government is faced with a dilemma. If they kill Savimbi, he may become a
martyr in parts of the population. If they make him stand trial for treason, the attention may
become unpleasant also for the Government. Some suggest that the best solution will be to
send him abroad with enough money to lead a decent life, in line with what has been done
with some other despotic African leaders.
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provincial governors, who are appointed by the head of state and have a
considerable influence in their regions.
Real political power seems to be built around an intricate system of patronage
and clientism. There are numerous speculations about who are represented in
the inner circle around the President, commonly known as “Miudos de
Futungo” after the residence where he stays (see e.g. Africa Analysis 1998,
Global Witness 1999). They come from government, the military, as well as
the business community. Common for most of them is that they seem
entangled in a web where they obtain various kinds of resources, opportunities
and benefits by virtue of the inadequate transparency and accountability in the
political system.
The constitutional reforms of 1991-1992 lifted the previous restrictions on
civil society. However, civil society is not sufficiently strong to represent an
efficient political force in its own right. Non-governmental organizations are
large in number but generally weak both financially and in  terms of human
resources, labor unions are generally passive as political voices even though
there are noticeable exceptions, and the media have to relate to a tight system
of control even though the number of media outlets (particularly weekly
newspapers) has increased. One force that has a potential political role to play
is the church, and Angolan churches have taken a number of peace-initiatives
particularly the past 1-2 years, including the Movimento Pro Paz and the
“Angola Group for the Promotion of a Culture of Peace (GAP). However, also
the churches seem entangled in the current power structures, and the Catholic
and Protestant churches do not have traditions for close cooperation.
2.1.1 Neo-Patrimonialism or Stalled Democracy?
Having given a relatively negative picture of the current state of the system of
governance in Angola,  the question still remains whether the situation
represents a permanent “neo-patrimonial regime”, or a “stalled transition” to
democracy that may be put back on track once the military situation
improves.
It is initially important to keep in mind that Angola does have a democratic
constitution, and an elected government. The constitution and its amendments
cater for a democratic state, and the civil society responded positively to new
opportunities in the early 1990s. There was an upsurge in the number and
type of voluntary associations, the press became much more active and
critical, and the church was given a freer position. There were also signs of
constructive cooperation between MPLA and UNITA,  particularly at the
regional and local levels (UNDP 1995).
As regards the elections, more than 90 percent of the eligible voters took part
and the elections were declared free and fair by international observers. The
results gave MPLA the victory in the parliamentary as well as the presidential
election, but UNITA received a fairly large share of the votes (Table 2). A
large opposition party has proven important in other new democracies.
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Table 2. Election Results, September 1992
Presidential Election Parliamentary Election
Candidate Votes (%) Party Members of Parliament
Jose Eduardo dos Santos 49.57 MPLA 129
Jonas Savimbi 40.07 UNITA 70
Alberto Neto 2.16 PRC 6
Holden Roberto 2.11 FNLA 5
Others 6.09 Others 9
Total 100.00 Total 219
Source: Tvedten 1997
It should finally be kept in mind that the Lusaka Accord from November 1994
gave considerable concessions to Unita. On the condition of demilitarization
of the movement, the government accepted a stronger role for Unita in
government (with a total of 4 ministerial and 7 vice-ministerial posts) and a
number of other positions in the public sector. According to most observers,
the Accord represents a good point of departure for the extent of power-
sharing it is reasonable to expect from an elected government.
Having argued that there is a democratic foundation, there is little doubt that
the developments since 1992 represent a severe setback as regards the options
for a democratic and accountable system of government. The democratic
institutions have not functioned properly, and according to a number of
observers (see e.g. UNDP 1999a, EIU 1999, Global Witness 1999, NDI 1999)
the MPLA and the government have become less democratic and more corrupt
in the sense of “abusing public roles or resources for private benefit”
(Amundsen 1999). UNITA on its part continues to be under strong autocratic
control by Jonas Savimbi, and with a “political wing” being divided into
several factions. At the same time, none of the smaller political parties have
managed to position themselves as real political alternatives. Equally
important, many  Angolans have lost faith in a democratic form of
government.
We will argue that it will be difficult to establish a truly democratic form of
government without external pressure. The vested interests among key
political actors in a continued situation of political unrest seem too strong,
and the danger of losing acquired riches with a transparent and accountable
system too big, for this to happen. It also seems unlikely that the government
will risk elections in the near future with the current deep economic crisis for
the large majority of the population.
In a longer-term perspective, internal pressure for a democratic and
accountable government may come from civil institutions and organizations,
as well as from popular uprising from an increasingly frustrated population.
There is tradition in Angola for interest groups and individuals pressing for
political change, from early colonial history, via the struggle for independence,
to sporadic strikes and uprisings particularly in Luanda. For the time being,
however, the Angolan police and security forces are likely to maintain effective
control and it will be difficult to find sufficient space for pressure from below.
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External pressure for political change in Angola has traditionally come from
the super-powers United States and Soviet Union, supporting each side in the
prolonged conflict as part of their agendas during the Cold War. With Soviet
Union having disintegrated and western powers like the United States, Great
Britain and  France having put Africa down on their political priority lists,
however, strong pressure for political change is unlikely to come from these
countries. Their economic interests in the country also complicates their more
general political agendas related to issues like democratization and human
rights (see below).
Peace-keeping operations under the United Nations have a dismal record in
Angola, with failed attempts at interventions to promote peace and democracy
and little if any credibility among the two main political contenders MPLA
and UNITA. The UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) left the country
in March 1999. It is unlikely that the UN will attempt such as endeavor again,
even though they are currently negotiating a return to Angola with an
observer status.
Regional powers have been involved in the Angolan situation both through
political and military support. With the internal problems and limited
resources in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and
Namibia, however, the options for pressure are limited. Angola’s relations
with South Africa have remained strained. While the country may apply some
pressure as a regional superpower, it has little economic clout in Angola to put
behind such pressure.
Aid conditionality is the classic mechanism for applying pressure in Africa, but
also here Angola is in a special situation. Aid is relatively insignificant in
economic terms representing only 9.9 percent of GDP, and with Angola’s oil
resources the government has even been in a position not to yield from
pressure from the World Bank and IMF.
This leaves the option of economic sanctions. Oil income is the basis not only
for  government income, but also for private riches enjoyed by the Angolan
elite. At the same time Angola depends on foreign oil companies for
technologies to develop the resources  particularly in ultra-deep waters.
Economic embargoes have recently been applied in the case of diamonds and
Unita, and there are of course also examples of oil-related embargoes being
use by the West to attain political goals such as Iraq, Iran and Libya.
External political pressures and embargoes raises a number of questions, not
least when applied towards democratically elected governments such Angola’s.
We will return to this in Section 2.4 (“Norwegian Dilemmas”).  First we will
assess recent economic trends in Angola, to have a better understanding of the
economic option for peace and recovery.
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Recommended readings: There is a large
amount of literature treating post-
independence political and military
developments, including Sogge 1992, Anstee
1996, Wright 1997 and Vines 1999.
Regarding current developments, the EIU
Annual and Quarterly Country Reports are
useful, but there are also useful web-sites
(see Section 5.2).
2.2 Recent Economic Developments
Important milestones, of relevance for understanding the current economic
situation, include:
· The discovery of oil outside the coast of Cabinda in 1955, and industrial
investments by the Portuguese towards independence in 1975 in an
attempt to hold on to the colony.
· Nationalization and a centralized planning economy following
independence, leading to a virtual standstill in all economic sectors except
the oil sector.
· The national oil company Sonangol is established in 1976, and a national
petroleum law is enacted in 1978.
· The off-shore area outside northern Angola is divided into 13 blocks in
1979, with the US company Chevron becoming the major operator.
· Deteriorating economic conditions during the 1980s, with agricultural
production in crisis due to the war and the parallel economy (candonga)
becoming the  main source of income for the majority of the population.
· The first program intended to begin the transition from central planning to
a market economy (SEF) established in 1987, but with little success.
· Oil and gas get an increasingly dominant position in the economy from the
beginning of the 1990s, as diamond production suffers from war and Unita
control of diamond producing areas.
· Yet another economic reform program (PES) initiated in 1994 with focus
on devaluation, fiscal stabilization and parallel exchange rates, still with
little success.
· Oil boom and increased debts hand in hand from the mid-1990s, with the
international interest in off-shore production reaching Klondike
proportions towards the end of the decade. 17 new deepwater blocks are
being awarded.
The combination of war, economic mismanagement and the extreme
dependence on oil has contributed to a distorted economy, where all other
sectors are at a virtual standstill including the vital agricultural sector (but
excluding the informal sector making it possible for the majority of the
population to survive). The limited domestic production, continued war and
corruption have also instigated a huge national debt, with Angola in reality
having mortgaged its own oil production for many years to come. Key macro-
economic indicators are given in Table 3.
C M I
10
Attempts have recently been made to rectify the economy, after the stream of
unsuccessful economic development programs throughout the 1990s. The
appointment of the former director of Sonangol to Minister of Finance, and
another Sonangol senior official to Governor of the Bank of Angola in early
1999, have improved the capacity and coordination between the key actors in
the Angolan economy. Successful measures were taken in May 1999 to close
the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates that have crippled the
economy, and negotiations for restructuring programs with the World Bank
and IMF have been re-established after periods of no contact. Despite positive
developments, however, the inadequate transparence and accountability
remains a fundamental problem and has hindered formal agreements with the
two international financial institutions.
Table 3. Macro-economic Indicators, 1993-1998
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP  (USD mn) 5,819 4,060 5,059 6,615 7,612 6,675
Real GDP Growth (%) - 23.8 1.4 11.3 11.7 6.6 - 3.8
           Oil-sector - 8.4 9.2 12.0 12.0 3.2 6.8
           Non-oil sector - 31.4 - 3.8 10.8 11.4 9.3 - 11.5
GDP per capita (USD) 506 341 415 529 595 510
Exports fob 2,900 3,017 3,723 5,095 5,008 3,510
Imports fob 1,463 1,454 1,852 2,040 2,477 2,014
External debt (USD mn) 10,158 10,818 11,675 8,499 9,269 -
External debt (% of exports) 338 342 304 158 177 256
Debt service ration (% of exports) 65 56 47 39 36 47
Long-term debt arrears (USD bn) 4.0 4.8 5.5 2.3 - -
Overall budget deficit (% of GDP) 22.9 20.1 27.3 10.4 19.7 15.7
Inflation (%) 1,838 972 3,784 1,651 150 135
Source: Hodges (forthcoming 2000).
The inadequate transparency first and foremost relates to the dominant oil-
sector (see Table 4 and 5).
Table 4  Breakdown of Angolan GDP per Sector (%)
1996 1997 1998 1999
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 7.3 9.6 12.6 10.2
Oil and gas 58.0 48.5 38.5 47.7
Diamonds 3.3 3.8 6.4 6.3
Manufacturing 3.4 4.4 5.9 4.9
Electricity and water 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Construction 3.1 4.1 5.5 4.5
Trade and commerce 14.8 16.3 18.2 13.6
Non-tradable services 8.1 11.4 11.3 12.1
Import duties 1.9 1.9 1.5 0.8
Source: Global Witness 1999
Angola’s proven oil deposits have risen to some 6.5 billion barrels. At the
current rate of production resources will last for 22-23 years, but these figures
are likely to be adjusted upwards in the years to come. The agreements with
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foreign companies, through Joint Ventures (JVs) and Production Sharing
Agreements (PSAs), are generally considered to be beneficial for Angola. In
addition, the Klondike sentiment and competition among foreign companies
has made it possible to obtain additional benefits through e.g. sign-on
bonuses. Reports indicate that the international oil industry is planning to
invest over USD 18 bn. in Angola the next four years.
Having said this, a substantial proportion of the oil revenue (estimated at 40%
by IMF) never finds its way to the state budgets. Through various
mechanisms, large sums of money bypass the Treasury and are used for debt
servicing, direct payment to cover costs for the war and (again according to a
number of observers) high-level corruption.
Table 5. Forecast Government Receipts from Oil Industry, 2000-2005 (USD
Million)
2000 20001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Oil production (‘000 bpd) 897 1,063 1,167 1,190 1,070 957
Gross revenues at $12 3,928 4,654 5,113 5,210 4,686 4,192
Gross revenues at $18 5,891 6,981 7,670 7,816 7,029 6,287
Estimated  gmt. Receipts at $ 12 1,375 1,629 1,790 1,824 1,640 1,467
Estimated gmt. Receipts at $ 18 2,062 2,443 2,684 2,735 2,460 2,201
Source: Global Witness 1999
Very little investment takes place in other sectors of the Angolan economy
despite the huge economic potential. This potential is first and foremost
related to mineral resources, but also to renewable natural resources. Angola
has some of the most productive fishing resources in Africa that can become
very important if properly managed. Estimated current production is 170.00
mt, with a  TAC of  262.500 mt. Perhaps most importantly, the country has a
wide range of climatic zones and soil-types that makes the agricultural
potential enormous. Only an estimated 3 percent is currently being cultivated.
The apparent chaotic state of affairs of the Angolan economy raises the
question of whether the oil income can be used for economic and social
development in a situation of relative peace.
2.2.1 Can the Dutch Disease be Cured?
Angola suffers from all aspects of the so-called “resource curse”.2  The country
has a vastly overvalued exchange rate, the public sector deficit and the current
account deficit have both hovered around 20 percent of GDP during the
1990s, and the country suffers from high inflation and a huge foreign debt.
This chaotic macroeconomic state of affairs is not uncommon among oil-
                                           
2 The Dutch disease describes a situation where large inflows of foreign exchange to a country
cause the exchange rate to appreciate, rendering industries subject to foreign competition less
competitive.  Consequently, capital and labour are reallocated towards industries producing
for the home market only, e.g. the service sectors and often government provided services.  If
and when foreign exchange inflows level off and decline, a financial crisis is often the result.
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exporting countries in the developing world, but it is not a necessary outcome
of oil-led growth. Rather, the windfall oil revenue creates opportunities for
excesses, and the government together with the small elite with access to
revenue and international credits have fallen prey to the temptations that
follow huge financial inflows.
Managing an oil-led development is difficult because financial resources are
volatile and outpace the absorption capacity of the economy during the
booming years of oil-led growth.  If the entire oil revenue is spent domestically
on various government programs and higher wages than would have been
possible without these revenues, it is difficult to adjust to declining oil prices.
The country typically runs into government budget and current account
deficits and accumulation of internal and external debt.  The initial programs
and investments tend to collapse, and resources are consequently wasted.
Angola already has experienced Dutch disease-related problems.  In order to
avoid that they become a development problem in future, Angola needs to
follow a prudent macroeconomic policy:
· The government should narrow the budget deficit and in the long run aim
for budget surpluses in years of oil prices above the long-term trend;
· The exchange rate should not be allowed to appreciate too much in order
to keep the non-oil economy competitive;
· Mineral revenue should be invested in productive capacity as long as the
social return to such investments is acceptable.  Rehabilitation of
infrastructure and investment in human capital probably yields the highest
social returns in Angola at this stage of development.
The third point on the list relates to the absorption capacity of the economy.
Productive capacity is built through investment in human capital (education
and health), infrastructure and business' investment in productive assets. The
rate of return of each of these assets depends on the availability of each of the
other. Therefore, social and infrastructure investment programs need to be
carefully balanced to the need and capacity of the economy.
Botswana has a similar resource base as Angola, e.g. a mineral-led
development path, and has followed the rules of macroeconomic management
stated above.  The Botswana government has had a budget surplus for almost
every year since the early 1980s.  The windfall mineral revenues have been
managed by setting up two funds, one revenue stabilizing fund for smoothing
government expenditure in the face of short-term fluctuations in mineral
revenue, and one public debt service fund.  The latter has accumulated
reserves over time, which have been invested abroad.
In spite of Botswana's prudent macroeconomic management, social programs
and industrial policy measures the country still has a substantial poverty
problem and there has been little diversification of the economy. A staggering
38 percent of the population is below the poverty line. Besides, the Botswana
government has expanded too much and is at present undergoing reforms in
order to become smaller and more efficient.  Botswana's experience clearly
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shows that sound macroeconomic policy is necessary, but certainly not
sufficient to create social and economic development.  It also demonstrates
that the existence of abundant financial resources may create incentive
problems and undermine entrepeneurship.
In Angola oil revenue has largely been spent on the war.  The war itself and
neglect of social sectors and infrastructure have left the country in a situation
of appalling social conditions and devastated economic, social and physical
infrastructure. A comprehensive recovery program is therefore necessary in
order to get the economy going once the war has come to an end.
Mozambique is seen as a model for post-war rehabilitation and economic
reform.  Its recovery program has focused on private sector expansion,
agriculture, human capital development and infrastructure rehabilitation.
Furthermore, Mozambique has strongly emphasized primary education and
health services.  The program has resulted in rapid economic growth (6
percent annual growth on average during the 1990s and 8 percent after 1994),
significant improvements in social indicators, and an investment boom
involving both local and foreign investors.  The boom is, however, fuelled by
foreign inflows of aid and investment. The country has at present an equally
large current account deficit and budget deficit as has Angola, and the
currency has appreciated sharply. Mozambique thus runs the danger of
contracting the Dutch disease from foreign transfers.
A similar recovery program in Angola will probably sustain the present
current account and government deficits.  This is because although some of
the close to 40 percent of public expenditure that has been spent on defense
and security can be reallocated to investment and social sector developments,
the resources available for such expenditure are not as extensive as one might
think.  Almost all oil revenue that accrues to Sonangol in the foreseeable
future is already bonded and hence committed to external debt servicing.  A
large part of Angola's oil revenues in the future has in other words already
been spent.
The experiences of Angola, Botswana and Mozambique suggest that the
Dutch disease is inevitable in the face of large foreign currency inflows.
Nevertheless, Angola suffers from worse ills than the Dutch disease and needs
to create a basic platform for social and economic development. This requires
a recovery program, which inevitably will sustain deficits on both the current
account and the government budget.  Nevertheless, the two deficits need to be
set on a declining trend immediately in order to avoid a new setback as soon
as the oil price starts to decline.  Given its high present level, it very probably
will in near future.
Mozambique's policy mix of public expenditure programs on primary
education and health and rehabilitation of infrastructure in the major crop
growing areas, combined with market liberalization and encouraging the
private sector to participate in infrastructure developments in the major
industrial areas appears to be promising.  If undertaken on an appropriate
scale for Angola, incentives and opportunities for productive activities could
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be sufficient to generate income and government revenue making it possible
for social and economic development to be sustained while the government
budget and current account deficits narrow.
Recommended readings: General sources
on the Angolan economy include McCormick
1994,  EIU’s annual and quarterly reports
and Nordås et al. 1999. NDI 1999 puts
focus on the issue of corruption. As regards
the oil sector, useful web-pages include
www.gasandoil.com, www.mbendi.co.za and
www.eia.doe.go
2.3 Development Aid
Development aid to Angola has traditionally been limited both in real terms
and in relation to Angola’s own economy as measured by GDP. Also Norway
was late in entering agreements of cooperation with Angola.3 The aid flow to
Angola increased considerably from the beginning of the 1990s with the
termination of the Cold War, but it is still relatively limited compared to aid
flows to other countries in the region. The Community Rehabilitation and
National Reconciliation Programme from 1995 is still an important point of
reference for development aid in Angola, and the Round Table Mechanism is
an important way to mobilize assistance from the international community
(RoA 1995,  UN 1999).
Table 6: Net Official Development Assistance 1996-1998 (USD million)
Bilateral
donors
1996 1997 1998 Multilateral
donors
1996 1997 1998
Spain 41.8 30.9 25.2 EU 94.3 70.2 65.4
Portugal 33.5 29.4 23.9 WFP 10.4 13.5 2.7
Sweden 36.2 27.8 22.5 IDA (WB) 37.8 27.9 35.8
Norway 25.2 24.5 23.1 UNHCR 0.5 0.1 0.5
United States 25.0 22.0 28.8 UNDP 3.7 7.7 7.6
Others 132.7 92.0 91.0 Others 32.0 8.3 8.7
Total 294.4 227.0 214.5 Total 178.7 127.7 120.7
Source: OECD, forthcoming 2000
The most recently available OECD data, which excludes non-government
organizations, put net development assistance to Angola at USD 335.2 mn in
1998 (ORCD, forthcoming 2000). Of this, bilateral ODA is 63.8 percent and
multilateral aid is 36.2 percent. This represents aid per capita of
approximately USD 28, which is below the average for the Southern African
region (aid per capita to Mozambique is USD 66.8). According to the OECD,
the United States, Portugal, and Norway are currently the largest bilateral
donors in Angola, while the European Union, the World Food Programme and
IDA (the World Bank) are the largest multilateral donors (Table 6).
                                           
3 In the last half of the 1980s, Swedish aid represented around 70 percent of  total bilateral
assistance to the country.
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Norwegian aid represented a total of NOK 174.5 million in 1998, including
assistance through non-government organizations (Table 7). Norway has
continued to concentrate its efforts around humanitarian assistance and the
sectors of energy, education and fisheries, and Norwegian non-governmental
organizations remain important channels for implementation of the aid
efforts. With the establishment of  a Norwegian embassy in Angola and a well
qualified  (albeit small) staff,  Norway is in the process of becoming an
important actor on the development scene in Angola.
Table 7: Norwegian Development Aid to Angola by Budget Item (NOK mn)
Norwegian Development Assistance 1996 1997 1998
Long-term development cooperation 91 855 79 454 96 907
Extended cooperation - 63 1 837
Non government organizations 13 737 10 408 11 666
Experts and consultants 676 42 -
Industrial and commercial financing facilities 699 43 169 8 935
Multi-bilateral assistance - 175 722
Research and human resource development - - -
Humanitarian assistance 55 926 39 859 54 389
Peace, reconciliation and democracy 4 - - -
Debt relief - - -
Installment on loans - - -
Norfund - - -
Others - 32 110
Total 162 893 173 182 174 566
Source: NORAD 1999a
In general terms, however, there is a strong sense of fatigue among
international donors. This is particularly the case with countries and multi-
lateral institutions having worked in Angola for a long time. Sweden and the
UNDP are good examples. The difficult working conditions and the problems
of implementing longer-term development projects are important reasons. In
addition, there is still no real effort to coordinate international development
assistance by Angolan authorities. The Secretariat of State established for this
purpose under the Ministry of Planning does not function, and the
government seems content to leave emergency assistance and the social sectors
to the international community. UNDP and UCAH have been given
coordinating roles for development aid and emergency assistance respectively,
but none of them function optimally.
Having said this, a situation of relative peace is likely to enhance the aid flow
to Angola considerably. Countries with economic interests in Angola (such as
the United States and France) will allocate funds as part of their general
policy, and traditional donor countries are likely to intensify efforts with
reference to the extreme poverty in the country.
                                           
4 Considerable parts of Norway’s humanitarian assistance is in fact allocated to peace,
reconciliation and democracy, but this is inadequately captured in NORAD’s statistics.
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Recommended readings: Statistical data on
development assistance to Angola is
available in OECD forthcoming 2000,
UNDP 1999a,b and NORAD 1999. SIDA
publishes half-year reports (ASDI 1999).
The EU has recently published a critical
review of their aid to Angola (Sanches
1999). And Ball and Campbell (1998) give
a review of humanitarian coordination in
the country.
2.4 Norwegian Dilemmas
The situation in Angola at the turn of the millennium raises a number of
questions about Norwegian involvement in development assistance as well as
in the private (mainly oil)  industry. On the one hand Angola has a
government with low political accountability, a poor human rights record, and
an economy heavily affected by mismanagement and corruption. And on the
other the country has a population which is among the poorest and most
vulnerable in the world.
Table 8. Government Expenditure by Function 1994-1997 (%)
1994 1995 1996 1997
General Public Services 21.4 19.2 13.9 17.7
Defense and Public Order 33.7 31.4 35.0 36.3
   Of which recorded 19.5 18.2 27.6 18.1
Peace process 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.6
Education 2.8 5.1 4.6 4.9
Health 3.8 5.7 3.0 3.1
Social security, welfare and housing 2.2 3.1 2.1 5.3
Economic affairs and services 2.5 6.6 8.5 8.7
Interest (commitment basis) 19.7 18.9 21.0 9.9
Other (residual) 13.7 9.4 11.0 13.5
Source: Global Witness 1999
The problematic nature of the current situation is perhaps best illustrated by
the distribution of public expenditures (see Table 8). Allocations to defense
and public order reached more than 36 percent in 1997, at the same time as
allocations to education and health stood at a mere 8 percent. This is
considerably lower than other countries in the Southern African region.
Throughout the 1990s the Government has, with considerable right, defended
its allocations with reference to the fact that it is a democratically elected
government finding itself in a war situation against a rebel movement. It
should also be acknowledged by the international community that Unita is
very much a product of the West, having received political and economic
support from before independence up to the very end of the peace-process in
1992.
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Having said this, the recent emphasis in Norwegian aid policy on
concentrating support to countries with transparent and accountable
governments and favorable human rights records (NORAD 1999b) will
inevitably instigate debates about the cooperation with Angola in a post-war
situation. Such a situation will also raise debates about the involvement of
Norwegian (state-owned) oil companies in the country. In addition to the
general human rights context, the lack of transparency in the industry will
bring the conduct of the oil companies themselves under scrutiny.
Within a period of 3-5 years after a situation of relative peace, policy-changes
towards a more accountable government and allocation of national resources
to the social sectors should be expected. More concrete implications of the
post-war situation for Norway’s relations with Angola must of course be
drawn on the basis of a thorough assessment by MFA/NORAD and
discussions with Angolan authorities. In any case, however, a situation where
Norwegian development aid is used to substitute the government’s own efforts
towards poverty alleviation, and where Norwegian oil companies contribute
towards an oil income used for continued repressive policies, should be
avoided.
For the time being, Norway should intensify its efforts for constructive
dialogue with Angolan authorities by strengthening its presence and increase
allocations particularly to transitional assistance preparing for a situation of
relative peace. Norwegian oil companies on their part should enhance their
efforts to contribute towards transparency and accountability within the oil
sector.
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3. A Public Sector in Crisis
 The emphasis on public administration in Norwegian development aid
(NORAD 1999b) is based on the premise that a competent civil service is
essential for creating the conditions necessary for a positive social
development. The state should, according to NORAD, play a decisive role in
distributing resources, ensuring that the population has access to basic social
services and safeguarding human rights (see also World Bank 1997).
Most independent observers agree that public sector organizations in Southern
Africa perform badly (Therkilsen, forthcoming 2000). For most citizens the
provision of education, health care, road maintenance, law and order,
agricultural extension and other services have deteriorated.  The roots of these
problems are contested. Some point to the importance of the marginalization
of Africa in the global economy, contributing to the extreme resource scarcity
of public sector operations and their poor performance. Others single out poor
macro-economic policies as a major cause of fiscal instability, deteriorating
economic growth and increased inflation, all contributing to declining state
capacity.  And finally, the problems of the public sector in Africa are
increasingly regarded as institutional and caused by inappropriate governance
arrangements (Olowu 1999, Mutahaba et al. 1993).
All these factors are relevant when assessing the system of public
administration in Angola, with the additional problem of a near-permanent
state of war that has made many public institutions un-reachable for
government. The civil service in Angola is currently considered to be in a
particularly dismal state also compared to other countries in the Southern
African region, with low performance and a limited or negative impact on key
development areas.
The Angolan public administration was highly centralized already under the
Portuguese colonial rule. Independence brought a sharp reduction in the
number of qualified civil servants, at the same time as state structures were
given expanded political and economic responsibilities within the centralized
state. During the last decade, with democratization and liberalization on the
agenda, the public administration has become even less efficient.
Centralization of power around the presidency, erosion of economic resources
and continued low levels of competence and capacity among its staff have all
contributed towards a public sector in crisis.
In the following we will first give an outline of the system of public
administration in Angola, and the main constraints under which it works.
Under the assumption that relevant information on socio-economic conditions
will be vital to improve the capacity of the public sector to contribute to
development, we will then make an assessment of the social sciences in Angola
and their capacity to carry out relevant socio-economic research.
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Recommended literature: General literature on
public sector reform in Africa include World
Bank 1997, Olowu 1999 and Mutahaba et al
1993. The situation in Angola is described in
MAPESS 1999 and UNDP 1998. Information on
the situation on the regional and local levels is
scant, but some information is available in RoA
1995 and ASDI 1996.
3.1 The System of Public Administration
The system of public administration in Angola is concerned with the execution
of  decisions made by the political bodies in the country. In Chapter 2.1 we
accounted for the constitutional distribution of power, and the actual situation
giving considerable influence to the President in the day-to-day management
of state affairs, limited power the government and individual ministries, and a
marginal role for the regional and local levels of government. In addition,
public companies suffer from inadequate resources .
The main components of the system of government and public administration
are:
· The Presidency  (Head of State, de facto head of government. Commander-
in-chief of the armed forces. Appoints provincial governors).
· The Council of Ministers ( Formally accountable to both the head of state
and the national assembly, de facto accountable to head of state. Formally
headed by the prime minister, de facto headed by the head of state).
· Ministries (Currently altogether 28 ministries and secretariats of state, with
around 90 ministerial and vice ministerial posts. Divided into departments
and directorates).
· Provincial Government (18 provinces and provincial  governments.
Governors appointed by the Head of State. No elected provincial bodies).
· Municipal Government (163 municípios, headed by municipal
administrators who are appointed by regional governors. No elected
municipal bodies).
· Communal Government (532 comúnas headed by communal
administrators. No elected communal bodies).
· Traditional authorities (Sobas are formally not part of  the system of
public administra-tion, but receive salaries from the government. Play an
important role in the absence of government institutions).
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· Public companies (Organs with their own legal status and administrative
and financial autonomy. Operate to achieve the objectives of state plans.
There are approximately 250 state owned enterprises in Angola).
Looking more closely at the characteristics of Angola’s system of public
administration, public institutions are normally divided into six different areas
by function (see Table 9). In terms of sectorial distribution, 57 percent of the
total number of civil servants are allocated to the social sector, primarily
health and education. The political-institutional sector has 16 percent of the
workforce, the economic sector 16 percent, infrastructure 6 percent and
security sectors 4 percent.
Table 9 Types and Functions Main Organs of Public Administration
Type of
institution
No. of
Employees
Institutions with largest
number of employees
Function
Sovereignty 1,692 · Presidency
· National assembly
· Courts
Guarantee representation of the
state and legislative activity,
regulation of interests and
protection of citizens
Security 15,455 · Min. of Interior
· Min. of Defense
Maintaining internal order and
territorial integrity
Political-
institutional
28,067 · Min. of Terr. Adm.
· Min. of Justice
· Min. of Finance
Support of state management,
economic management, public
finance, planning etc.
Social 130,830 · Min. of Education
· Min. of Health
· Min. of Social
Assistance
General social services, increase
level of education and health,
assist less-favored strata of the
population
Economic 12,846 · Min. of Agriculture
· Min. of Trade
· Min. of Fisheries
Support to economic growth
through industrial expansion,
trade and agriculture
Infrastructure 6,683 · Min. of Public Works
and Housing
· Min. of Transport,
Works and Telecom.
Expand basic infrastructure such
as roads, water, electricity,
transport and communications
Source: UNDP 1998
A key characteristic of the public administration is its size. Between 1990 and
1998, total civil service employment rose by 49 per cent from 131,178 to
195,786.5 The figure represents 5 percent of the total workforce, and a ratio of
population per civil servant of 63. This is  low in the Southern African context
(but not compared to the OECD, where the equivalent figure is 14). In
Mozambique, for example, each civil servant serves 165 citizens.
84 percent of all government employees are employed at the level of provincial
or local government (Table 10). These are the levels of government with the
poorest access to economic resources, and many public institutions at the
provincial and local levels have been at a virtual standstill for years. An
                                           
5 The figure does not include the estimated 90.000 troops in the Angolan Armed Forces
(FAA).
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important exception is the region of Luanda, which currently has 32 percent
of the total number of employees in provincial and local government.
Table 10. Public Employees by Province
Province Population No. % Province Population No. %
Bengo 11,5747 2,536 0.97 Kwanza Sul 667,699 9,506 4.85
Benguela 1,595,924 20,007 10.21 Luanda 2,027,687 63,032 32.19
Bié 814,984 8,360 4.26 Lunda Norte 171,829 2,765 1.41
Cabinda 193,713 10,810 3.51 Lunda Sul 22,918 3,158 1.61
Cunene 599,744 13,563 1.43 Malange 793,894 7,597 4.06
Huambo 1,601,890 17,092 1.17 Moxico 460,068 5,807 2.96
Huíla 940,056 17,092 6.92 Namibe 144,411 6,744 3.44
Kwando
Kubango
173,350 2,802 8.72 Uíge 981,664 8,093 4.54
Kwanza
Norte
600,688 6,147 3.13 Zaire 137,735 2,763 1.41
Source: Mapess 1999 / Hodges 200 (forthcoming)
Administrative and support staff each represent 38 percent of the total number
of civil servants in Angola, with professional staff  representing 26 percent.
Since 1990 there has been a marked increase in the number of administrative
and support staff, at the expense of  professional staff (Table 11).
Table 11. Distribution of Human Resources by Category of Post and Gender
Category of Post Percent of  Total Female (%) Male (%)
Senior Professionals 3.5 27.4 72.6
Professionals 0.3 22.3 77.7
Mid-level professionals 23.0 34.4 65.6
Administrative staff 38.6 41.9 58.1
Support staff 38.6 43.2 56.8
Source: Mapess 1999 / Hodges 2000 (forthcoming)
The level of education among civil servants is very low. Only 3% of
government employees have university education, and only 16 percent have
education at upper secondary or technical levels (ensíno medio). Almost 30
percent have four years or less of primary education, which normally will
imply that they are functionally illiterate (Table 12).
Table 12. Distribution of Human Resources by Level of Education
Level of Education Percent of total Female (%) (Male %)
Less than 4 years 16.6 21.1 13.5
4 years  (I nível ensino de base) 13.3 11.7 14.8
6 years  (II nível ensino de base) 20.5 1.7 21.1
8 years  (III nível ensino de base) 29.9 31.6 28.8
Technical college (ensino médio) 13.2 11.6 14.2
Upper secondary school (pré universitário) 2.7 1. 3.3
University qualifications 2.6 2.4 4.3
Source: Mapess 1999 / Hodges 200 (forthcoming)
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Salaries are fluctuating and extremely low (Table 13). There was a steep
decline in salary levels in the middle of the 1990s due to excessive inflation.
Civil service salaries and benefits accounted for only 8 percent of total
recorded government expenditure at their lowest point in 1996-97, rising to
12 percent in 1998. In 1998 the average civil service salary was calculated at
less than half of the price of the minimum basket of goods and services for an
urban household of eight persons.
Table 13: Minimum Salary (USD per month)*
November 1991 March 1995 November 1998
Directors 401 11 107
Managers 209 6 N/A.
Senior professionals 337 8 75
Mid-level professionals 170 5 43
Low-level professionals 73 2 N/A.
Skilled workers 71 3 31
Unskilled workers 19 1 16
Minimum wage 15 1 13
Source: Mapess 1999 / Hodges 2000 (forthcoming). * Average monthly salaries converted to
USD at parallel exchange rate.
Looking beyond figures and numbers, there is little doubt that the civil service
is in a severe crisis. Particularly at the regional and local levels many public
institutions have not functioned at all, either because of the  war situation or
because of lack of capital and human resources. 86 percent of the employees
in the public sector argue that poor working conditions have a major effect on
their productivity.
Where the government institutions are functioning, the work is severely
affected by an administrative culture characterized by a hierarchical and
centralized system. There is hardly any administrative and fiscal
decentralization of decision-making, and within ministries there is little
delegation of responsibility and a general fear of making decisions.
In relation to the public, the inefficiency has led to a general perception of the
sector not being there for the public good. The low pay and moral among
employees has also contributed to a system of bribes and corruption, where
people often have to pay for services that in the outset should be free of
charge. Around 70 percent of the civil servants see nothing wrong in accepting
“presents” (gasosa) for their services.
The situation described is valid for most public institutions, including those
most relevant for Norwegian development aid. As mentioned the unit
established to coordinate development cooperation under the Ministry of
Planning does not function, implying that donors have to relate directly to the
ministry or ministries relevant for their activities.
The Ministry of Education is generally considered to be in the most
problematic situation, with an oversized staff and poor administrative
routines. The Ministry does have a special section for international
cooperation, but this is largely detached from the other departments and
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sections. The problems are acknowledged by people in leading positions in
that ministry. The Norwegian Refugee Council, the Norwegian organization
with the most direct relation to the Ministry of Education, argues that the
cooperation is problematic and seem to avoid direct relations as much as
possible.
The Ministry of Petroleum is generally considered to be among the most
competent and effective in the country, with a number of well-qualified
people. Nevertheless, while the top management is competent and capable the
implementation of decisions is negatively affected by more limited capacity at
the middle and lower levels. This seems particularly to affect less “vital” areas
not directly related to production, such as the development of laws and
regulations for safety and the environment in which Norwegian aid has been
involved.
The Ministry of Fisheries is in the outset important and attractive for civil
servants. For the lower levels the direct access to fish is lucrative, and for
people at higher levels their role in relation to allocation of fishing licenses and
the extensive privatization in the sector has been important. Despite a high
degree of stability among the staff, however, there are serious problems with
decision-making and efficiency. The Institute of Marine Research in Norway
has encountered considerable problems in implementing a program related to
fisheries research.
Norwegian NGOs working in Angola (primarily Norwegian Peoples’ Aid and
the Norwegian Refugee Council) have experience from working with regional
and local government. While the resources both in financial and human terms
are more limited than in the central administration, the smaller size and closer
cooperation between employees at this level seem to make some of these
institutions function relatively well.
The poor state of affairs of the public administration has resulted in a
proliferation of private solutions, particularly in the areas of education and
health but also in areas like security. These options are primarily open to the
better-off strata of the population, leading to a divided society between a small
minority who can buy services and a large majority who either do not have
access to services or have to pay for the inferior services offered by the State.
For the international donors, the weak public administration has generally had
two main implications. On the one hand, cooperation is often entered directly
with NGOs and other civil society institutions, even in cases where the State
would be a natural partner. On the other hand, special structures are often
erected within the ministries in order to secure a more effective cooperation.
These “islands” are supplied with superior equipment, higher salaries and
other special benefits to the people involved.
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3.1.1 A System Beyond Repair?
The poor state of the system of public administration in Angola is related to
factors external to the system itself. These must be solved before significant
improvements in the performance of the public sector can be expected.
One basic condition is the need to curb inflation and transfer sufficient funds
to make the level of income for civil servants adequate. This will reduce
absenteeism as well as the need to supplement income by taking  tips or bribes
(gasosas).
A second condition is the need for administrative and fiscal decentralization to
the various levels of government that makes it possible to make decisions and
carry them out, thereby rendering work more meaningful both for elected
officials and civil servants.
A third condition is the need to implement the Local Government Act and
elect representative bodies also at the regional and local levels, which will
make local government and public administration more accountable to the
population they are to serve.
Even with a more conducive political and economic context, however, the
challenges remain formidable. The low level of education, the poor working
conditions, the lack of tradition for internal delegation of responsibilities, and
the weak sense of public duty or service among officials will have to be
rectified.
Changes in these areas will demand increasing resources and (most likely) a
reduction in the number of government employees, but also institutional
development efforts in a broader sense. Training will be a key component.
In many ways the system of public administration may seem beyond repair,
but there are positive experiences to build on. One is the extent and speed of
reform carried out during the era of liberalization in the beginning of the
1990s. The ensuing openness and enhanced performance in public sector
organizations implies that the system has the potential for change given the
right external conditions and policy inputs.
A second positive experience to build on is that some of the “islands” in the
system having been given additional resources have improved their
performance. This again shows the potential with improved conditions. To
avoid the problems following from isolated individually based interventions,
key ministries and departments should initially be selected for interventions
involving staff at all levels of the organization.
The main responsibility for reform rests with the government, but institutional
development should also be an important part of development cooperation
programs. The relatively negative experiences from the all-encompassing
Programme of Institutional Reform and Administrative Modernization
(PRIMA) imply that more pilot-like interventions should first be initiated. The
experiences with twinning arrangements (i.e. broad-based cooperation
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between sister-institutions in the South and North) are relatively positive
(Tvedten et.al 1998).
Realistically it will take years before the public sector can supply the Angolan
population with the goods  and services they are entitled to. In addition, the
role of the public sector in relation to the private sector and civil society is also
likely to undergo significant changes when the process of economic and
political liberalization continues (World Bank 1997). There is no doubt,
however, that a functioning public sector is a precondition for development
and poverty alleviation in Angola.
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4. Planning for Development in a Void
With the profound external and internal problems currently affecting the
performance of the public sector in Angola, the issue of  access to information
for planning and implementation of government policies may seem a bit
redundant. With the main bottlenecks being contextual and systemic,
information per se will not solve any problems. Again assuming that the
political and economic conditions will improve, however, proper knowledge
about the Angolan society will be essential for the success of future
development policies. Moreover, building up relevant social science
competence and capacity will take time.6
There is a serious a lack of information about very basic socio-economic
conditions in Angola, even though some institutions like the Instituto
Nacional de Estatística (INE) have done impressive work with the limited
resources they possess. After years of war and unrest there have been dramatic
changes in demographic structures, economic adaptation, political affiliation,
social organization, and cultural perceptions. Information is also inadequate
as regards civil organizations and popular associations in rural and urban
areas, that will play a central role in Angola’s future development.
At the same time, socio-economic research in Angola has been limited for a
number of reasons. The most obvious one is the security situation, which has
left most parts of the country un-researchable. In addition the government has
not actively encouraged research of this type,  at least partly for fear of what it
may reveal. And finally, the options for carrying out socio-economic research
under the current financial conditions has been limited for the researchers
themselves.
To take a closer look at the state of affairs of the social sciences in Angola, the
field has historically had a relatively low status and played a marginal role.
This has primarily to do with the weak Portuguese tradition for social science
research in the colonies,7  and  the strong emphasis on industrialization after
independence giving precedence to disciplines like engineering.
The marginal position is underlined by the fact that there is no social science
faculty at the main university in Angola (Universidade Agostinho Neto), and
the social sciences also play a marginal role in other institutions of higher
learning including the recently established Catholic University (Universidade
                                           
6 According to the new Encyclopædia Britannica the social sciences can be defined as “any
discipline or branch of science that deals with the social and cultural aspects of human
behavior”. It generally include economics, political science, sociology and related sciences. In
the case of Angola, the most important social sciences have been political science, sociology,
history, anthropology, demography and public administration. Economics is often considered
a separate discipline, and have a stronger standing in Angola than other social sciences
particularly in the public sector. The discipline will be treated as a special case in this report.
7 This does not necessarily mean that research was not carried out, but that most of  it was
done with the purpose of defending the colonial cause which tended to weaken its quality qua
research (see e.g. Areia and Figueiras 1984)
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Católica de Angola). Social science subjects have been taught in primary
school (ensino de base), but the books in history and geography are very
general in scope. The situation is somewhat better at secondary level (ensino
médio), with more social science disciplines and better qualified teachers.
Having said this, there is a core of well-educated and competent social
scientists in the country. Many of them have their education from abroad
(primarily former Eastern Europe, Portugal and Brazil, but also from other
western universities.) In the early 1990s the number of Angolan social
scientists studying or working abroad was estimated at 30 percent of the total
number of academics working in this field within Angola. It is likely that there
still is a number of well-qualified Angolan social scientists currently studying
or working abroad.
The exact number of social scientists in Angola is difficult to ascertain. The
Association of Anthropologists and Sociologists in Angola (AASA) presents a
list of 46 social scientists active in the fields of anthropology (9), history (14),
sociology (11), demography (3) and economics (9) (Pacheco 1997). However,
the number is probably considerably higher if counting people with a social
science background who currently work in other fields. In line with this, the
UNDP took an initiative in 1998 to make a roster of social scientists
(including economists) interested in working for the UN and received 150
responses.8
The social scientists in Angola can be broadly divided into two main
categories: One category works within the university system, under very
difficult conditions and with very limited resources. The other category is
made up of people who have left the state institutions, and work for national
NGOs, international organizations or as private consultants. Most of these
have to pursue several income earning opportunities (many of which are not
related to social science research) in order to make ends meet.
Common for both categories is a limited experience with applied research
(defined as “the use of social science ideas and methods for policy-oriented or
practical purposes”). The first category work in academic institutions with
limited tradition for such an approach, while those working as consultants
tend to have too little time and too limited resources. The few more
comprehensive applied research projects done the past decade (see e.g. Hunt
1991, Hurlich 1991, UNDP 1995, Oxfam 1998, Wold 1999) are typically
headed by foreign consultants,  they are quantitative in nature, and they tend
to focus on Luanda or other more easily accessible urban areas.9
The ministries and development organizations using Angolan social scientists
commonly complain that the reports produced are “interesting, but not very
useful”. The inadequate skills in writing applied research reports is related to
                                           
8 Those interested filled in questionnaires about educational background, experience etc., but
the data have never been systematized.
9 Important exceptions are the UNDP-reports on Human Development in Angola (1997,
1998, 1999) supported by Norway, where Angolan social scientists have played important
and constructive roles.
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the lack of training in how to write this type of document, but also to the
limited experience most Angolan social scientists have with government
ministries and donor organizations and hence their limited knowledge of the
priorities these organizations have.
Before looking into the ways the social sciences in Angola can become more
relevant for development policies and practices, we will give a brief sketch of
the most important institutions training and employing social scientists in
Angola.
4.1 Institutions of Higher Learning
4.1.1 Universidade Agostinho Neto
Universidade Agostinho Neto (UAN) was originally established by the
Portuguese in 1962. It took its current name in 1985, in honor of its first Vice-
Chancellor and Angola’s first President Agostinho Neto.
Formally the University consists of six faculties (i.e. the faculties of science,
agriculture, law, economics, engineering and medicine) and a higher institute
of educational science (Instituto Superior de Ciências de Educação, ISCED).
In addition, the university formally includes several research centers.
Table 14. Agostinho Neto University (formal structure)
Faculty Institutes No. of
teachers
No. of
students
Faculdade de Ciências Biologia; Geográfia; Física; Geofísica;
Geología; Matemática; Quimica
97 665
Faculdade Ciências
Agrárias
Agronomia; medicina veterinária 51 300
Faculdade de Direito Júridico civil; juridico económico;
(juridico político)
56 891
Faculdade de Economia Economia; gestão 67 115
Faculdade de Engenharia Architectura; eng. civil, minas, electró-
nica, informática, mecánica, quimica
144 621
Faculdade de Medicina Medico-Cirúrgico 140 506
ISCED, Luanda Filosofia, história, francesa, inglesa,
portuguesa, matemática, pedagogia,
psicologia, sociologia
118 1705
ISCED, Bengula História, francesa,  matemática,
pedagogia, psicologia, geografía
66 546
ISCED, Lubango Filosofia, história, francesa, inglesa,
portuguesa, matemática, pedagogía,
psicologia, biología, química, geografía,
física
74 938
ISCED, Huambo Filosofia, história, francesa, inglesa,
portuguesa, matemática, pedagogia,
psicologia, sociologia
15 629
Source: UAN 1998.
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Luanda is the main site of the Agostinho Neto University, but there are also
university centers in Lubango and Benguela.10 In 1998 the University had
registered a total of 528 academic staff (docentes, professores), 123 support
staff and 7916 students (UAN 1998). The faculties, their departments, number
of staff and number of students are listed in Table 14.
In addition to the faculties and the teachers training institutes, the university
formally includes six research centers. These are: i) Centro Nacional de
Investigação Científica (CNIC), ii) Centro de Estudos e Investigação em
População (CEIP); iii) Cátedra UNESCO em Engenharia Quimica e
Ambiental; iv) Laboratória de Exploração e Produção da SONANGOL; v)
Centro Nacional de Recursos Fitogenéticos; and vi) Grupo de Trabalho de
SABONET Angola.
The university also has a number of formal agreements with foreign research
institutions, primarily with universities in Portugal (11) and Brazil (7), but also
with universities in Italy (1), France (1) and Spain (2).
In reality, the Faculties, Centers and Agreements of Cooperation at the
Agostinho Neto University function very poorly. According to the last annual
report of the university from 1997 (UAN 1998), only the Faculdade de
Ciências Agrículas, the Departemento Juridico-Politico and the Instituto
Superior de Ciências da Educação in Huambo do not function at all.
However, practically all other institutions have a very low level of activities.
According to the “1997 – 2001 Plan of Action” (UAN 1998) published by the
university itself, the main problems are:
· Unclear organizational structures
· Lack of qualified (post-graduate) teaching staff
· Low level of payment that makes it impossible to survive on university
salaries
· Students with poor educational background
· Part-time students who have to work in order to survive
· Very poor facilities both in terms of building standards and equipment
There is little doubt that the Agostinho Neto University is in a deep crisis, and
it is not very likely that it will get access to sufficient financial and human
resources to re-establish itself as a functioning university within the
foreseeable future. As in the public sector in general, however, there are
“islands” that function relatively well thanks to access to special resources
and/or dedicated staff.
Regarding social sciences in particular, there is as mentioned no separate
Faculty of Social Science if disregarding the Faculty of Economics. An
initiative to establish such a faculty was taken by the former Rector of the
University, but since she left in mid-1999 this has not been followed up. Social
sciences are mainly taught as minor courses at the Faculty of Engineering and
Faculty of Economics. The Centro Nacional de Investigação Científica (CNIC)
                                           
10 The branch in Huambo is destroyed and has not functioned for several years.
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was established to initiate and coordinate research also in the social sciences,
but does not function.
The institution at UAN currently most directly involved in social science
research is the Centro de Estudos e Investigação em População (CEIP). It
employs five demographers and sociologists, and is funded by UNFPA. In
addition to minor research projects, the Center runs a course in demography
followed by around 15 students from different faculties. Despite the resources,
however, the Center  suffers from most of the problems listed above.
The institution of higher learning with the strongest general social science
component is the Instituto Superior de Ciências de Educação (ISCED). ISCED
in Luanda has a separate department of social science, and offers 4-year
courses in history and sociology. With this course, students obtain a
licensiatura in education, with specialization in history or sociology. The
courses have well-qualified teachers, and also draw on social scientists who
are not permanently employed by ISCED.
Again, however, the institution suffers from the problematic context both in
Angola and within the University system. It is difficult if not impossible to
devote sufficient time to academic work both for teachers and students, and
the drop-out rate is relatively high. As a teachers training college, moreover,
there is limited space for social science research per se.
4.1.2 Universidade Católica de Angola
The initiative for establishing a private Catholic university was taken by the
Angolan Catholic Church in the mid-1990s. The university was formally
established in 1997, and the first students were accepted in the fall of 1998.
The university has been supported economically by the US-based Citizens
Energy Corporation, and several oil-companies including Mobil, Engen, Saga
and Sonangol. The funding is channeled through the Angola Educational
Assistance Fund.
With superior remuneration and working conditions, the Catholic University
(UCAN) has been able to attract a number of well qualified teachers. Several
of these were formerly employed at the Agostinho Neto University. The 458
students currently enrolled pay a tuition fee of USD 250 per month, and have
to cover expenses for room, board, books etc. themselves. The University
offers a one year preparatory course due to the poor educational background
of the large majority of students.
UCAN runs courses in law (Ciências Jurídicas), economics (Curso de
Economia), public administration (Curso de Gestão) and computer science
(Engenharia Informática). All courses take five years, and lead to a licensiatura
(M.A. equivalent). There is an interest in expanding the courses to other
disciplines including the social sciences, but no specific plans exist. As seen
from Table 15, showing the curriculum for the preparatory course, social
science disciplines do not currently have a prominent position at UCAN.
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Table 15. Curriculum Preparatory Course, Law and Economics/Public
Administration
Law (Preparatory Year) Economics/Public Admin. (Preparatory Year)
Semester 1 Semester 2 Semester 1 Semester 2
Portuguese Portuguese Portuguese Portuguese
English English English English
Introduction  Law Informatics Mathematics Mathematics
Methodology Ethics Informatics Ethics
History History Economic Geography Introduction Law
Philosophy Philosophy Methodology
Latin Latin
Source: Universidade Católica de Angola
The Catholic University is in a very early phase of its existence, and emphasis
seems to be given to gain experience from the courses currently offered before
expanding academically and geographically. In addition, being a private
university and having spent considerable funds on the physical upgrading of
its premises in Luanda the economic basis for expansion is uncertain.
4.1.3 Other Institutions of Higher Learning
In addition to the two universities described above, two other institutions of
higher learning are in a planning phase. One is the Universidade Luciada, and
the other is the Universidade Nova de Angola. There are apparently also plans
for establishing an institution of higher learning under the umbrella of the
Fundo de Eduardo dos Santos (FES). With the limited economic and human
resources existing, creating new universities at this stage does not seem to be a
wise policy.
4.1.4 Applied Research Organizations
As emphasized in the introduction to this section, probably the majority of
social scientists in Angola are currently employed by NGOs, aid organizations,
private consulting companies or as private consultants.
The government institution employing the largest number of social scientists
(6-8) is the Central Bureau of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatística,
INE), which is part of the Ministry of Planning. The two most important
Angolan NGOs employing social scientist are Action for Rural Development
and the Environment (ADRA) and  Angolan Action for Development (AAD).
Common for these institutions is that they are primarily occupied with
shorter-term consultancies, and have limited options for training and longer-
term research. They are also heavily dependent on foreign donors.
Several Angolan social scientists are also employed by aid organizations on a
permanent or part-time basis. These include UN organizations (such as UNDP
and UNICEF), international NGOs like OIKOS and Development Workshop,
and special institutions like the UN-related Human Rights Division. Also
people working in these institutions are primarily working with shorter-term
consultancies.
C M I
32
In addition to people working for institutions, there are some who have
established private consulting companies. Most of these are small with limited
capacity, including Consulteste. There is currently an initiative to establish a
larger institution with the preliminary name Angola. Investigação Social, with
a core group of 15 social scientists and plans for a system of affiliation of
others.
4.2 A Role for the Social Sciences?
We have argued above that social scientists have an important role to play in
the future development of Angola. Information about and analysis of socio-
economic conditions will be vital for the planning and implementation of
development policies and interventions. What follows is a outline of possible
policies and interventions to enhance the status and role of the social sciences
in the country. Actual interventions will have to be prepared in much more
detail, and involve Angolan social scientists to a much larger extent, than what
has been possible within the framework of this report.
We have shown that the status and role of social sciences currently is weak.
Social science disciplines do not have a prominent position at the institutions
of higher learning, and social scientists work under very difficult conditions.
The relatively few that are in a position to work as social scientists on a full-
time basis (primarily employed by NGOs or development organizations) are
normally overloaded with work of a type that leaves few options for research
and generation of new knowledge.
4.2.1 Training and Research
To enhance the status and role of social science in Angola, efforts have to be
made with respect to training, basic research as well as applied research. Basic
training and basic research is of course vital for the development of the social
sciences in Angola, but do not in itself solve the need for relevant and
applicable information. Interventions to support training in applied work
should therefore be done simultaneously.
First of all there is a need to establish a separate Faculty of Social Science in
Angola. Given the current lack of resources this should be done on a modest
scale, but it is necessary to gather the scattered teaching and research now
taking place in order to make it more effective and visible. With the
disciplinary traditions existing, departments of history and sociology/
anthropology seem most relevant. The Faculty should be established within
the confines of the Agostinho Neto University. Having said this, cooperation
should be encouraged with the Catholic University which seems promising
particularly in economics.
With the long period of decay of institutions of higher learning in Angola,
relations with academic institutions in other countries will be vital. The
current agreements of cooperation do not function properly primarily because
they are not filled with real professional content. Relations need to be
reciprocal to work. Guest researchers from abroad and scholarships for
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Angolan academics to study in other countries should still be important, but
more efforts should be made to embark upon joint research projects.
Combining academic and applied work is an increasingly common feature of
African universities. On the one hand, the universities depend on additional
sources of funding through work for government, the private sector and aid-
organizations. Being involved in applied consultancy work, moreover, also
give academic institutions more direct contact with the society they are to
serve. There are a number of examples of successful applied research units
within universities in the Southern African region (Tvedten et al. 1999).
Given the number of Angola’s more senior social scientists employed and
active outside the university sector, it will finally be necessary to improve
relations between the university and these individuals at least in an initial
phase. Many do teach on a part-time basis already, and relations should be
built both around teaching and applied work.
4.2.2 The Role of Aid Organizations
With the current political and economic situation in Angola, it is likely to take
time before Angola’s ministries and other government institutions will be
active users of social science expertise. NGOs and aid-organizations should
therefore play an important role in an initial phase. By actively using social
scientists in their projects, they can also contribute to a broader acceptance of
the need to generate solid socio-economic information about the Angolan
society.
A basic problem for the bilateral and multi-lateral organization is the dearth
of information about the social scientists in Angola and their qualifications.
Initiatives should therefore initially be taken to develop a roster of social
scientists, including their education, institutional affiliation, and work
experience. The information obtained by the UNDP mentioned above should
be a good point of departure. Similar rosters in other countries in the region
often include regulations about conditions of employment in order to have a
unified system.
With adequate information about the social scientists in the country, care
should be taken to involve Angolans in research to the maximum extent
possible. As a rule of thumb, work should be given to Angolan institutions
and researchers when the necessary competence and capacity exist. When
employing foreign consultants, these should always work with Angolan
colleagues even if the main purpose is training. It is particularly important to
involve Angolan researchers in  all phases of the project cycle (i.e. planning,
implementation, data-processing, writing and evaluation) and not only during
field-work which very often is the case (Tvedten et al. 1999).
Institutional cooperation is an increasingly important part of efforts to further
develop academic institutions in the South (Tvedten et al 1998.). In line with
this, there are a number of collaborative agreements between universities and
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independent research institutions in Norwegian development cooperation.11
In the case of Angola it seems particularly pertinent to establish links with
Mozambique. In addition to sharing language and cultural background, the
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) has been in a similar poor state of
affairs as the Agostinho Neto University but is now in the process of
rebuilding itself. It also has experience in establishing applied consultancy
units within the university structures (Tvedten et al. 1999).
Improved research capacity is of little use if the issue of distribution of
research results through articles, reports, seminars etc. is not taken sufficiently
into consideration. In Angola more academically oriented research ouputs
have few potential outlets. More practically oriented research material (often
commissioned by international aid organizations), tend to end up in shelves
and cupboards.12 Aid organizations are normally not very good at distributing
reports, evaluations etc., either because of neglect or unwillingness to share
critical assessments of their own activities.
There are primarily two alternative types of initiatives to improve the
accessibility of social science research in Angola. One is to give support to the
development of new (or further developing existing) more academically
oriented publications, possibly by paying social scientists small fees to produce
articles and by covering costs for editing and printing. The other is to
contribute to the development of systems making applied reports more easily
accessible. The responsibility should preferably be located in Angolan
institutions (the university, an NGO, the national library). If necessary in a
transitional period, however, an aid organization should assume the
responsibility to act as a central for other institutions that would have to
commit themselves to supply all relevant literature.
In conclusion, with improved options for a situation of relative peace there
will be a strong need for building up knowledge about the socio-economic
conditions in post-conflict Angola. The current situation for the social sciences
is very difficult, with a marginal academic role and limited options for
constructive participation in policy formulation. To further develop the basis
that is there and secure future recruitment, immediate interventions are
necessary. The primary responsibility for enhancing the status and role of
higher education in general and the social sciences in particular rests with the
government. However, in a transition period the aid organizations have an
important role to play.
We will end this section by forwarding the idea of a larger-scale national
research project involving Angolan and foreign social scientists from various
disciplines. A concerted effort of this type, with the objective of identifying key
constraints for the alleviation of poverty, will represent a vital source of
information for government and development institutions and an important
catalyst for the development of social science research in Angola.
                                           
11 Cooperation of this type is envisaged to become part of the re-established Norwegian Peace
Corps
12 Important exceptions are the Human Development Reports on Angola which have been
given an accessible format.
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Recent advances in research around “household livelihood strategies” makes it
possible to combine micro- and macro studies in a systematic way and to
develop comparative data from different regions in the country with relatively
limited resources (Rakodi 1999, Moser 1998, Carney 1998). The focus is on
household access to capital assets, and the effects of external variables on
household livelihood strategies. Key capital assets include i) natural capital;
physical/produced capital; financial capital; human capital, social capital and
political capital. Key external variables include macro-economic fiscal and
monetary policies; fiscal and public expenditure meso-policies; and particular
circumstances of regional/local economies, settlements and households. By
linking these approaches, one gets a systematic understanding of the most
important internal and external factors influencing the livelihood strategies of
Angola’s poor and vulnerable population.
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Annex 1. Terms of Reference
Terms of reference for landkompetanse på Angola
1. Bakgrunn
Det vises til kontrakt signert 24.03/22.04.99 mellom Direktoratet for
Utviklingshjelp (NORAD) og Chr. Michelsens Institutt (CMI) vedrørende
ekstern landkompetanse på Angola. Som landansvarlig (team leader) for
Angola har CMI oppnevnt forsker Inge Tvedten. Det vises til årlig
planleggingsmøte avholdt i NORAD 31.08.99 hvor partene ble enige om
følgende oppgaver for 1999:
2. Arbeidsoppgaver
2.1 Konsulenten utarbeider en ressursside om Angola, med UD/NORAD og
andre potensielle brukere som målgruppe. Siden skal inneholde: i) en oversikt
over ressurspersoner som på ulike måter arbeider med Angola i Norge, ii)
linker til relevant Angola-informasjon på nettet, iii) kortfattet bibliografi over
relevant informasjon knyttet til historie, politikk, økonomi og samfunn.
2.2 Konsulenten skal utarbeide en årlig rapport om utviklingen i Angola for
1999.
Rapportens faste del skal inneholde:
- en oppdatert gjennomgang av de viktigste utviklingstrekk i Angola i 1999 i
henhold til separat TOR for Country Report Part I, gjennomgangen skal også
inneholde en kort vurdering av den regionalpolitiske situasjonen.
Delrapporten skal være kortfattet (10-15 sider) og ha relevant personell i
UD/NORAD som målgruppe.
Rapportens fleksible del skal inneholde:
- en generell oversikt over angolansk forvaltning, med spesiell referanse til de
viktigste sektorer for norsk bistand (fisk, olje/energi, utdanning). Tilgangen til
informasjon er begrenset og nærmere analyser av enkeltsektorer vil eventuelt
bli gjennomført som tilleggsoppdrag.
3. Feltarbeidet
Feltarbeidet i Angola vil bli gjennomført i perioden mellom 12.11.99 og
12.12.99 og vil vare 1-2 uker. Feltarbeidet har to hovedmål:
· å oppdatere konsulenten om generelle utviklingstrekk i Angola slik at han
skal være best mulig rustet til å oppfylle sine forpliktelser i forhold til
brukere i NORAD/UD.
· å samle relevant informasjon i tilknytning til oppdraget under den årlige
rapportens fleksible del.
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Ambassaden i Luanda vil bistå med å legge praktiske forhold til rette for at
oppdraget kan gjennomføres på best mulig måte. I henhold til kontrakt
mellom NORAD og CMI skal oppdraget gjennomføres innen rammen av
totalt fem ukeverk. Utkast til rapport skal leveres innen 15. januar 2000.
NORAD forplikter seg til å kommentere utkastet innen 31. januar. Endelig
rapport skal leveres senest 15. februar 2000. Det vises til pkt. 8 i kontrakten
mellom NORAD og CMI vedrørende opphavs- og eiendomsrett til
dokumenter som er produsert under denne kontrakten.
Oslo, 5.11.99
Tore F. Gjøs
Seksjonssjef
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Terms of Reference Country Report, Part I
1. Background
NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledge the need for
assistance from external resources in the form of reviews of economic, social,
political and cultural conditions in selected countries of principal co-operation
to augment Norwegian country specific knowledge. This country report is
intended to be one such devise for increased knowledge.
2. Objectives
The objectives of this kind of report is to complement NORAD’s and the
Embassies’ knowledge about the selected countries of principal co-operation
by increasing the understanding of economic and social conditions in the
selected countries of principal co-operation and thereby increasing the
competence to deal with economic, institutional and social problems.
As the amount of information and documentation from competent local and
international organisations and agencies is huge, the need for external topical
competence is to synthesise, analyse and evaluate the available information, to
analyse general developmental trends, and possibly to participate in planning
processes. Furthermore, in order to acquire an overall perspective of the
present situation in these countries, it is also important to address other issues
such as historical, cultural, sociological and political aspects.
3. Scope of work
To generate information to establish the necessary background knowledge, the
work shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, presenting and assessing
the following:
1. Economic and institutional indicators:
· the selected countries’ present economic performance by looking at macro-
economic trends, strengths and weaknesses;
· possible bottlenecks to development of the economic sector;
· current trends in national plans, policies and strategies to improve
economic performance;
· ongoing administrative reforms (Civil Service Reforms, Public Expenditure
Reforms) and assess the domestic capacity, the resources available and the
political will to undertake administrative reforms;
· trends in public expenditures and income;
· trends in bilateral and international agencies’ on-going and planned
assistance to the country.
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2. Social, political and cultural indicators
· the development in social indicators;
· to briefly describe obstacles to an effective implementation of development
programmes;
· political will to reform the political system and to consolidate democracy,
human rights and equality and to alleviate poverty.
The work shall be carried out through:
· desk studies;
· discussions with the authorities, local NGOs, and local researchers as well
as bilateral and international development agencies;
· field visits to relevant business communities, libraries, universities and
research communities.
4. Reporting
The reports are mainly for sue by NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as a tool to increase the quality and the effectiveness of the Norwegian
development assistance to selected countries.
A draft report shall be presented NORAD for comments not later than two
weeks after departure from the country to which NORAD shall submit
comments within two weeks. A final report shall be presented to NORAD not
later than two weeks after comments have been received from NORAD.
An oral presentation of the draft report shall be undertaken both to inform
NORAD about the work process and to facilitate a discussion of the draft
report to provide comments to the draft.
The report shall be written in English. NORAD shall receive 6 copies of the
final report.
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Annex 2. People Met
NAME POSITION INSTITUTION
Aboague, Alexander Senior Economist UNDP, Luanda
Adauta, Mário Consultant Angola. Investigação Social.
Amado,  Dr. Filipe Professor UAN, Centro de Ensino e
Investigaão em População
Caine, Allan Director Development Workshop (DW)
Castello, Antónia Docente UAN, Centro de Ensino e
Investigaão em População
Carvalho, Carlos António da
Costa
Docente / Conselheiro Fundo das Nações Unidas Para
a População (FNUAP)
Coelho, Virgilo Secretário Geral Associação de Antopólogos e
Sociólogos de Angola (AASA)
Curado, Maria Imakulada
Soares E.C.
Directora de Gabinete de
Intercâmbio International
Ministério de Educação
Dahl, Ellen Administrator Norwegian Refugee Council,
Angola
Da Costa, Anónio Fernandes Professor/Administrador Universidade Católica de
Angola (UCA)
De Barros, Helder Project Manager United Nations Office for
Project Services (UNOPS)
De Carvalho, Paulo Administrador / Director CONSULTESTE. Pesquisa de
Opinião Mercado e Consultoria
Ekker, Harald Second Secretary Norwegain Embassy, Angola
Fransson, Kjerstin First Secretary Swedish International Develop-
ment Authority (ASDI), Luanda
Kolding, Jeppe * Researcher  / Administrator Norwegian Institute for Marine
Research
Leite, Bjørg Ambassador Norwegain Embassy, Angola
Lencastre, José Garcia Docente / Chefe do
Departemento de Sociologia
Universidade Agostinho Neto –
ISCED, Luanda
Macundo, Cornélio Chefe do Departemento de
Cooperação
Ministério de Educação
Mingas, Daniel Politicólogo / Vice-Director Universidade Agostinho Neto –
ISCED, Luanda
Musæus, Halvor * Norwegian Ministry for Energy
and Petroleum
Neto, Maria Ondina Director Institutional Reform and Adm-
Inistrative Modernization
Programme, MAPESS/UNDP
Neto, Manuel Director Geral Adjunto Accão para o Desenvolvimento
Rural e Ambiente (ADRA)
Oftedal, Thor Second Secratary Norwegian Embassy, Angola
Robson, Paul Researcher Development Workshop
Rocha, Teresa Assistente Social MINARS
Teixeira, Alfredo G. Senior Technical Advisor Institutional Reform and Adm-
inistrative Modernization
Programme, MAPESS/UNDP
Viegas, Walter Luís Alves Representante em Angola OIKOS. Cooperaão e
Desenvolvimento
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Summary
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This is the first report on Angola under the Country Advisor
Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development
Co-operation (NORAD), the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI)
and the Nordic Consulting Group (NCG). The report consists
of two parts. Part I comprises an assessment and a synthesis
of basic information regarding economic, political and social
developments in the country. It devotes particular attention
to the current politico-military situation in which UNITA
seems to be suffering decisive military defeat, and the options
for using Angolas vast oil income for economic and social
development in a situation where relative peace appear
promising. Part II gives an overview over the system of
tertiary education and existing social science capacity in
Angola. It is argued that the lack of updated and relevant
information about socio-economic conditions in the country
will be a major constraint in the planning and implementation
of development policies and programmes.
